This article seeks to identify the different factors that have facilitated or impeded the integration of immigrants in France from a historical perspective. Its aim is to shed light on the contemporary debates on the alleged failure of the republican integration model. First, we will show that -with the formation of the nation state -the integration of migrants was a constitutive element of the social cohesion of French society. Later, and during periods of xenophobia in particular, immigrants were classified according to their ability to assimilate into the French society. Since the 1970s, the double-barrelled integration question -concerning migrants and social cohesion -has reappeared. Within this context, the 'colour-blind' French republican model has been challenged, primarily from an economic perspective, not only by persistent social inequalities, but also, in its quintessence, by demands for cultural recognition. These factors have reinforced racial discrimination, the success of the populist extreme right and recurrent assimilation pressure.
Introduction
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, France has been an immigration country. During the twentieth century and in the 1920s and the 1960s in particular, approximately 300,000 migrants arrived in France each year (Noiriel 1988) . Most of the children and grandchildren of the newcomers over the last few decades -Poles and Italians before the Second World War, Spaniards and Portuguese in the 1950s and 1960s, North Africans in the 1960s, Asians and West Africans in the 1970s and 1980s -have become French citizens. According to the 2006 French census, 25% of the population has at least one parent or grandparent who immigrated to France (INSEE 2008, p. 46) . Does this mean that their integration was successful? How has their economic situation and cultural background, including the relationship between France and their countries of origin, interfered with this process?
As from the late 1970s, there were significant changes. Indeed, as shown in Table 1 , the percentage of immigrants from Europe decreased, while the proportion of those from Asia, and particularly from Africa, grew. Moreover, while there were significantly fewer workers, family migrants and asylum seekers increased considerably. Furthermore, over the same period, the economic situation in France deteriorated. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the rate of unemployment has never been lower than 7%, and in 2012, the global rate was approximately 10%. Unemployment is particularly high for less qualified workers, including many immigrants. In 2012, almost 30% of Algerian immigrants were unemployed (CAS 2012, p. 7) . According to a report published by the High Council for Integration (HCI 2011, p. 14) , French citizens with parents immigrating from non-European countries are twice as likely (24.2%) to be unemployed than other citizens. Those who do not hold a diploma are particularly affected (40.5%).
But qualified citizens of non-European origin are also significantly more likely to be unemployed than qualified people of French descent (14.1% against 4.6%). These figures show that racial discrimination affects specific categories of French citizens, even when they are relatively skilled, and that young people of Sub-Saharan and North-African origin are the main targets. Undoubtedly, the integration of the immigrants and their descendants into the French society has become more difficult. We can notice this regardless of whether integration policies have been implemented by socialist or conservative governments.
These indicators of unemployment and racial discrimination suggest that the so-called French republican model of integration has become less effective. This civic and assimilationist model is one of the three models of citizenship referred to in the introduction of this special issue (see Loch). Civic-territorial means that citizens voluntarily and politically identify with the egalitarian values of the nation; on the contrary, cultural and religious differences have no political legitimacy in the public sphere and are thus banished to the private sphere. Assimilationist means that, in practice, this model is accompanied by a strong assimilation to dominant French values which claim to be universal. This politico-cultural model has been based on the socio-economic integration of immigrants, particularly in the industrial society. Given the increase of unemployment since the 1980s, our main hypothesis is that the crisis faced by the republican model stems from the socio-economic exclusion that has developed both within the context of a post-industrial economy and globalisation. Nevertheless, as the data previously cited shows that racial discrimination also affects relatively skilled French citizens, we cannot neglect the issues linked to cultural differences, and subsequently to the core of the colour-blind republican model. But how do we define those who are targeted by this discrimination?
Since 1990, there is no longer any ambiguity between immigrants and foreigners in the French census. Today, official surveys clearly distinguish between these two categories of immigrants: the first have kept their foreign citizenship, whereas the second came to France as foreigners and obtained French citizenship later. In the 2008 census, the number of immigrants was 5,342,000, among whom 3,715,000 were foreigners. Their children, if born in France, are not considered immigrants. Under the 1889 law introducing jus soli, they automatically benefit from French nationality when they come of age. As the French census does not collect data on ethnic origin or religious beliefs, they become statistically invisible.
In spite of the arguments developed by scholars such as Simon (2008) and Héran (2010) advocating the need to identify descendants of immigrants in order to gain more insight into their social situation and thus get an in-depth understanding of the discrimination they experience, most decision-makers and experts have repeatedly refused to use ethnic or racial terms when referring to French citizens. The resistance to give ethnic minorities an official status can be explained by the republican principles of unity and equality, which are also shared by most French citizens of immigrant descent. Article 1 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic proclaims the French State as a 'one and indivisible' nation state, prohibiting the recognition of any organisational infrastructure based on specific linguistic, territorial, ethnic or religious membership that could threaten these principles. To understand these paradoxical situations, we will now develop our historical analyses following the steps mentioned in the abstract and then revert back to our main hypothesis.
2. The social cohesion of the French society and the integration of immigrants Like other Western European countries, France became an industrial society and a modern nation state in the nineteenth century. During the last decades of this century, political elites succeeded in building a republican democracy represented by institutions with secular principles of a cultural universal. The integration of this national society with regard to social cohesion was assured by the fact that these elements -economy, state and culture -were related to each another and so formed an equilibrated unit (Schnapper 2007 , see also Wieviorka in this issue).
Within the territorial borders of a modern nation state, this unit was based on common political and cultural values. However, integration does not only mean equilibrium of a social system or a nation. It is also a process in which individuals and groups have been socialised into this system. After the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, it was the working class that was socially and politically integrated into this French industrial and national society. The so-called Trente glorieusesthe years of continuous economic growth and full employment from 1945 to 1975 -were the culminating point of this type of society.
Republican intellectuals, and especially sociologists, have reflected on these historical processes and on integration. Durkheim (1984) showed how the social cohesion of modern society and the individual integration of its citizens were based on common values and solidarity. In The Division of Labour in Society (1893), he described its modern forms by analysing the change from mechanical to organic solidarity. This was accompanied by a change from collective consciousness of groups to the individuation of citizens in advanced industrial societies. An integrated society is ultimately a society of individuals. Against this background, the integration of the French modern society was guaranteed by two mechanisms: the institutions and industrial work (Lapeyronnie 2009 ). Institutions ensured socialisation. The common republican norms and values for the cohesion of the nation were transmitted not only by the republican school in particular, but also by other institutions such as the family, the justice system or the social work organisations and by associations. Labour constituted the second mechanism for integration in the upcoming industrial society. Via employment, it led to upward social mobility and gave the workers a social status. Furthermore, it allowed them to experience class conflicts and solidarity in the communist 'red suburbs' (banlieues rouges). The result was the social and political integration of the working class into the French industrial society.
In this context, immigration has been fundamental in the emergence of this society, for the formation of the modern nation state and for the creuset français, i.e. the melting pot à la française. Indeed, after the working class, immigrants were the last group to be integrated into the nation (Noiriel 1988 ) via labour and social institutions. Most immigrants were employed in industry, construction or civil engineering, and had been recruited during periods of economic growth. This socio-professional situation enabled their social integration into the French working class and made it possible for them to participate in French politics via trade unions and left-wing parties. The institutions socialised them, the youth in particular, and assimilated them to French norms and values, which were proclaimed as universal. The integration of migrants was therefore not perceived as a problem. The word integration was rarely used, neither in political discourse, nor as an analytical concept by scholars. Even the will to develop a policy of integration was inexistent; this process seemed to be working by itself (Weil 2005) .
In sum, diachronically, the integration of migrants began by social integration via housing, schooling and the labour market; this did not prevent specific forms of community building. Their assimilation followed. The last step in this process was their national identification and via naturalisation, their access to full political participation (Dubet 1989) . Concerning socio-economic integration, until the end of the 1970s, various censuses showed that the children of immigrants experienced greater upward social mobility than their parents. This was primarily because of the higher level of education they received in public schools (INSEE 2005) and French economic prosperity. A real intergenerational social mobility into the French working class had developed (Verret 1999) , of which a large number of immigrants could also benefit.
Between assimilation and accommodation
However, several periods of social crisis counteracted those of economic growth and the corresponding social mobility. The most crucial was the 1930s crisis, which led to high unemployment and violent xenophobia among the French population, including the working class (Schor 1985 ). Yet, this crisis also provided a political response in favour of the integration of migrants. In 1936, the government of the Front Populaire created a Junior Ministry Office to deal with immigration. Although its existence was short-lived, it took some important measures in facilitating the acquisition of French citizenship (Weil 2005) .
Nevertheless, during the years preceding the Second World War, French immigration policy was influenced by racist ideas and the integration process was transformed into coercive assimilation. With the economic crisis and the impending arrival of refugees, France adopted a national and racial quota policy based on a list of 'races and peoples' ranked depending on assimilability. The main theorist behind this new policy was Georges Mauco, a scholar who published a doctoral thesis in 1932 on the role of migrants in the French economy. Taking migration issues within the French demographic evolution into account, he analysed the 'assimilability' of immigrants depending on their origins and developed a composite scale in which Arab workers were at the bottom and Italians, Swiss and Belgians were at the top (Weil 2003) . Although Mauco supported the Vichy Government only until 1944, his influence remained important even after the Second World War. When the government of General de Gaulle created a High Population Council (HPC) in April 1945, Mauco was named its general secretary, a position he held until 1970. This did not prevent the HPC from passing an immigration law. The 2 November 1945 Act established an egalitarian, individualist and progressive system for issuing permits without ethnic selection. This act still forms the framework of French immigration policy. Nevertheless, ideas about the assimilability of certain immigrant groups and the non-assimilability of others have not entirely vanished. In fact, they returned with vigour during the economic problems experienced in the 1990s and 2000s.
Official declarations concerning the equality of all immigrants did not prevent civil servants entrusted with immigration policy from confusing integration with assimilation, and from promoting differentiated treatment for immigrants considered difficult to assimilate (Laurens 2009 ). In particular, immigrants from former French colonies were not treated in the same manner as those from Southern Europe. Although French authorities did not establish a specific integration policy in their favour, there was increased social control. However, their integration into the labour market was not particularly efficient. Given their low professional qualifications, they often held marginal jobs in the industrial and service sectors. Even during periods of economic growth, their unemployment rate was higher than the average. Given this context, many of them cultivated the 'myth of return' (Sayad 1999 ) and aspired to create an independent business with their savings.
From the perspective of the French authorities, the immigrants' governments of origin and even from their own personal perspective, these immigrants remained foreigners in France; consequently, the issue of their integration was of little importance. France delegated social and cultural policies to the consulates and associations controlled by the governments of the countries of origin. Accommodation -defined as 'adaptation and adjustment to the special interests and needs of groups' (O'Leary and McGarry 2012, p. 14) -seems to be the best term for the policies implemented towards these workers, who resided in France over long periods while their families remained in their home countries. However, as these individuals were considered to be inassimilable, they focused on transferring remittances to their countries and on eventually going back home. The French public policy supported them in adapting to conditions of life which had somewhat been imposed.
Urban segregation and second generation: the return of social cohesion
Up to the 1980s, there was no real political debate on integration in France. The government appointed a Secretary of State for migrant workers in 1975. His main role was to control and reverse migration flows rather than to develop an integration policy; he was also responsible for housing issues and cultural matters. Indeed, in spite of the return allowances given by the French authorities under Raymond Barre's government (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) , very few families did return home. On the contrary, several workers with families still living in the countries of origin took advantage of a more flexible immigration law and brought them to France. Wives and children of immigrants already settled in France represented the largest number of newcomers in the 1980s and 1990s. They accounted for about 60% of the 120,000 new immigrants registered on average per year (INSEE 2005) .
These families settled in social housing within working-class neighbourhoods, previously inhabited by the French middle classes but now characterised by increasing rates of unemployment, social exclusion and residential and ethnic segregation (Barou 2002) . Households with sufficiently high incomes succeeded in moving to middle-class areas. While the majority of the outgoing population was of French or European origin, most immigrants of non-European descent had to remain in the poor neighbourhoods. The children of these mostly unskilled and illiterate workers, recently arrived in France or born in the country, were enrolled in segregated institutions and were often faced with school failure. As they dropped out of the education system without graduating, their upward social mobility was very low. Those who obtained diplomas were often the target of racial discrimination from employers who refused to recruit them.
This second generation of non-European immigrants, primarily of Maghrebian descent and at the margins of the labour market since the 1980s, experienced a different type of integration compared to former immigrant generations in France. These were -in the diachrony of the integration process -first socially integrated, then assimilated, before finally also identifying politically with France. By contrast, the aforementioned second-generation migrants can be considered to be assimilated to French values and culture but at the same time, as socially and politically excluded (Dubet and Lapeyronnie 1992) . This discrepancy leads to frustration and fuels urban unrest, like that in the suburbs of Lyon at the beginning of the 1980s (for differences with Germany, see Loch in this issue).
This unrest and the subsequent riots of the 1990s raised awareness among the French public of new urban problems. Furthermore, with the emerging social problems linked to a post-industrial economy (structural unemployment, social exclusion, etc.), a political and academic debate on social cohesion had arisen. In this context, urban unrest, which symbolised the integration of immigrant youth, was perceived as a challenge with regard to cohesion. In 1981, the new government led by François Mitterrand and dominated by socialists came into power. This was the moment to address these issues.
Scholars (Dubet 1987 , Bachmann 1989 ) and politicians like Hubert Dubedoutthe first president of the National Commission for the social development of poor neighbourhoods -agreed that the problem was fundamentally social. Based on the British 'inner city policy' model, a new urban policy was implemented to develop social integration and political participation within the poor neighbourhoods suffering from residential and school segregation, unemployment, delinquency and other problems (Donzelot 1991) . This politique de la ville did not target explicitly ethnic, but rather urban minorities selected according to social and spatial criteria. In place for over 30 years irrespective of the government in power, this policy can be considered as the hard core of the French integration policy. However, due to the republican principle of equality, the ethnic composition of the population living in these selected districts has never been highlighted, even though a significant proportion is of North-African or Sub-Saharan origin.
The results of this urban policy have not been insignificant, as has been shown by the evaluations carried out in the 2000s (Estèbe and Donzelot 2004) . Housing has been considerably improved, neighbourhoods have benefited from numerous public facilities and inhabitants' associations have been encouraged to take initiatives. However, the rate of unemployment has remained much higher than the national average (Fitoussi et al. 2004 ) and delinquency has worsened.
Moreover, new religious demands have emerged within the public space. In a secular country like France, demands by some Muslim girls to wear a veil in high school have been seen as a provocation and have always given rise to spirited debate. At the same time, Muslim associations have increased and have called for the building of mosques and the recognition of their religious rites. In return, public authorities have accused some religious opinion leaders of choosing to obey God rather than the laws of the Republic. From a less ideological viewpoint, scholars have analysed the various forms of Islam emerging in the West; on the one hand are neo-communitarian, secularised forms that demand recognition at the community level; on the other are more marginal forms of Islamic groups (Kepel 1997) .
Within this new social and urban context, public authorities decided to define a corresponding model of integration. In 1990, the French Government created a 'High Council for Integration' composed of scholars, politicians, activists and personalities of immigrant descent who were entrusted with this work. In their report -titled 'For a French integration model' (Haut Conseil à l'Intégration 1991) -they developed a model that rejected the assimilation experience associated with the postcolonial period. Second, the report opposed the 1970s model of accommodation, which asserted that immigrants could maintain their cultural identities within the French society. It is defined as follows:
Integration is not midway between assimilation and insertion, but a specific process where the active participation in the national society of varied and different elements is encouraged. (HCI 1991, p. 32, translation JB) The latest definition given by the High Council for Integration in 2005 operates within the same framework:
Neither assimilation nor insertion, integration refers to the participation of all French people, and not only those of immigrant descent, in the public sphere of the national community. (HCI 2005, p. 34, translation JB) Undoubtedly, the republican myth of citizenship has been extensively used to justify the definition of the French model of integration (Favell 1998 ). In sum, there is a major discrepancy: on the one hand, there is a political discourse that adheres to the principle of equality, which justifies that some effort has been made towards acknowledging cultural diversity. On the other hand, administrative officials, local authorities and social workers have resorted to differentiated and pragmatic treatment when faced with suburban, socio-cultural and religious differences (with regard to the gap between immigration discourse and reality, see Entzinger in this issue).
Moreover, the High Council failed to take into account that the figures for immigrant integration and participation are no longer those of an industrial society (see Wieviorka in this issue). First, a post-industrial and global economy have abolished many unskilled jobs and created much less highly qualified employment. This employment demands a level of education and professional qualification that immigrants rarely have. As a result, many of them depend on social benefits and precarious jobs.
Second, the representative bodies of the French working class have lost their socio-political influence. The French Communist Party, for a long time the standard bearer of class politics, has been considerably weakened. Today, numerous workers express their social and political dissatisfaction by voting for the populist extreme right party Front national (FN) (Gougou and Mayer 2013) . A sharp divide has therefore developed between French workers, among them a large number of immigrant descent, and immigrants more recently settled in France. As the former working-class consciousness of the banlieues rouges has almost disappeared, a part of the low-educated classes populaires (urban 'underclasses') now withdraws into their nationalistic, ethnic or religious communities (Kepel 2012) .
Integration versus cultural recognition
Twenty years after the creation of the High Council for Integration, debate on integration and its policy remains controversial. On the one hand, the advocates of integration insist on the positive results of this process and on the implemented policies. Indeed, socio-demographic surveys carried out by the Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques (INED) (Tribalat 1995) indicate an overall improvement in the living conditions of immigrants and a rising level of education from one generation to the next (see also Entzinger for the Netherlands and Loch for Germany in this issue). Although children and, sometimes grandchildren, of immigrants are more affected by unemployment than natives, they are much more skilled and educated than their parents, and a significant proportion of them hold positions of responsibility in the economic and political fields (Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden 2001) . A large number of immigrants communicate primarily in French, and their children and grandchildren often no longer speak their language of origin. The lifestyles and social ambitions of these people increasingly correspond to those of other citizens. Furthermore, these surveys show that immigrants and their descendants share a certain number of common values with the native French population (Brouard and Tiberj 2005) .
These findings are strengthened by a comparative survey on Muslims undertaken in four European countries: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain (Pew Research Centre 2006) . French Muslims overall expressed the same opinions as Muslims from other European countries on social issues such as 'fear of unemployment' (84% versus 78% to 83% in the three other countries) and 'concerns about their future' (38% versus 28% to 48%). By contrast, they differed strongly on identity issues: 42% of French Muslims consider themselves first as national citizens (and not as Muslim), against only 7% in the United Kingdom (see also Meer and Modood in this issue), 13% in Germany and 3% in Spain. This suggests that Muslims living in France have absorbed the secular lifestyles of other French citizens. A larger majority sought to adopt national customs rather than remain distinct: 78% in France compared to 41% in the United Kingdom, 30% in Germany and 53% in Spain. They agreed with the French attitude of rejecting communautarisme; this means that they are sceptical about immigrants' withdrawal into ethnic communities, where solidarity is limited to one's own group.
Some of the scholars who support the concept of integration criticise the political and administrative elite for presenting the national model of integration as normative, and for believing that immigrants must adopt it without reserve. They distinguish between integration as a process depending on social conditions for which public authorities are not always responsible on the one hand, and on the other hand, integration as an order to conform to existing standards (Schnapper 2007) . Those who receive such an order, but have no possibility to participate in social life, would be forced to reject it. Other authors, such as Beaud and Amrani (2004) , go further in stressing these exclusionary factors that are particularly obvious in the integration process of second-generation migrants.
Opposed to this viewpoint, some scholars argue that integration is no longer an appropriate sociological concept; for them, integration can neither be used to analyse the incorporation of migrants, nor contemporary French society. Without supporting a multicultural model, they argue that immigrants and their children need cultural recognition. Integration does not therefore fail due to an absence of will or ability among migrants, but rather due to their social exclusion and racial discrimination. Consequently, cultural differences must be taken into account in public policies (see Wieviorka 2001 as well as his contribution in this issue). Although decision-makers and scholars cannot deny the increasing cultural diversity of French society (Doytcheva 2005) , many of them consider that multiculturalism is not an appropriate policy in a centralised nation state like France (Wihtol de Wenden 2003 , Weil 2011 . Moreover, the results of multicultural policies in some European countries have not always been positive (see Entzinger for the Netherlands in this issue). Nevertheless, the 'alleged death' of multiculturalism can also be interpreted as an ideological attack of conservative and populist right parties in Europe against cultural diversity; in contrast, like a 'zombie-category', the spirit of multiculturalism remains omnipresent and multiculturalism continues to be interpreted as a promising concept (see Meer and Modood and, to a lesser extent, also Borevi in this issue).
The impact of racism and discrimination
Debate on integration has been followed by debate on racial discrimination. In the name of egalitarian principles, the French republic claims to be blind to cultural differences, but this colour blindness masks the actual existence of racial discrimination. For a long time, French authorities believed that immigrants, for whom the acquisition of French citizenship was easy, had the same opportunities for success in French society as natives as they possessed the same social and civil rights. However, sociological studies towards the end of the 1990s began to underline the existence of racial discrimination with regard to access to work, housing or education (De Rudder et al. 2000) . Data show that many immigrants consider that they are victims of racial discrimination due to their ethnic origin, their religion or their dwelling place. In the survey Trajectories and origins carried out by the INED and the Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) in the Ile-de-France region in 2008 (INED and INSSE 2010) , 45% of the immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and over 30% of those from North Africa indicated that they were victims of discrimination. Among their descendants, they were 50% (Sub-Saharan Africa), 38% (Algeria) and 34% (Morocco, Tunisia) who indicated that they have experienced discrimination as Figure 1 shows it.
Although this table measures perceptions rather than 'assessed' discrimination, it shows the importance of racism as an obstacle to social integration. In particular, young men of North-African and Sub-Saharan descent are doubly disadvantaged: by this discrimination and by the aforementioned high levels of unemployment. Their image is largely negative in public opinion as it is frequently associated with juvenile delinquency and French urban riots. As a result, they counter this exclusion by dominating the young women in their poor neighbourhoods (Lapeyronnie 2008, pp. 507-593) . These women suffer less discrimination, especially when they demonstrate apparent signs of assimilation, such as modern occidental clothes (Guénif-Souilamas and Macé 2006) . By contrast, those wearing an Islamic veil encounter more difficulty in finding jobs, particularly in the public sector (Bouzar 2009 ).
Algerian and Sub-Saharan families are also particularly concerned by residential segregation; respectively, 50% and 35% of them live in rental housing built in the so-called zones urbaines sensibles (deprived urban areas). In these areas, the creeping 'process of ghettoisation' (Mucchielli 2006, pp. 24-27 ) is characterised in particular by family problems, ethnic concentration, school failure, high unemployment, ambivalent relationships with institutions and an (Lagrange and Oberti 2006, Kokoreff and Lapeyronnie 2013, pp. 37-40, 72-78) .
The public response to these riots was to reinforce the politique de la ville in order to continue tackling urban segregation. The last phase of this policy, named 'urban renewal', consists in destroying the most damaged buildings in poor neighbourhoods and in re-housing the inhabitants in better ones. Paradoxically, this contributes to strengthening residential segregation. Indeed, the families who have been able to benefit from this public action generally choose to live in socially mixed neighbourhoods with not only higher standards of living but also higher rents. By contrast, the most disadvantaged households find themselves in other deprived areas with newcomers from different origins (Lelévrier 2010) . This has weakened self-empowerment among immigrant families. Moreover, potential opinion leaders have also been tempted to flee such deprived areas in their search for better living standards. Their exit was the last step in the dissolution of the intermediary authorities in the former 'red suburbs'. These authorities -composed of working-class parties, trade unions and, later, middle-class associations -were responsible for representing the inhabitants and mediating between them and local institutions in case of conflict. Ever since, highly organised Islamist groups have tried to take over this function. However, French local authorities are not ready to recognise them as acceptable negotiation partners.
Moreover, both the violent events in the Muslim world over the last few years and the French colonial past have led to feelings of distrust towards Islam in French public opinion, still partly influenced by prejudices inherited from this period (Bancel et al. 2005) . Issues like the Algerian war of independence (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) or the treatment that Muslims underwent during the colonial period have been used by French citizens with North-African or Sub-Saharan descent, like Les indigènes de la République, in their struggle for recognition. Although these groups benefit from all civil rights, they consider that they are treated like natives in colonial times and seek to be recognised as genuine fellow-citizens. Such demands have provoked sharp debate among the representatives of the repatriated people from Algeria, who are still relatively influent in Southern France. They defended a law glorifying the 'positive aspects of colonisation'. This law, adopted in 2005 and consolidated in 2007, illustrates how colonial memory splits French society. The challenge is to integrate both colonial and migration history into the general history of France, and to understand the demand for cultural recognition as a legitimate demand for more equality.
Finally, the populist extreme right has been taking advantage of declining social cohesion, status inconsistency and nationalism (Wieviorka 2013) . The fear of Durkheimian anomie and the risk of losing social positions have provoked a rejection of immigrants. Differences have appeared as a threat to social order and as a challenge for ethnic exclusionary status politics. Leaders of the FN have made citizens of North-African descent scapegoats by denouncing them as living in closed communities and 'islamising' French suburbs; cultural difference is seen as an obstacle to the integration of migrants. The right wing party Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP), fearing to loose a part of its electorate, has been copying FN positions and the electorate of both parties now appears to be merging (Fourquet and Gariazzo 2013) . In this political climate, the French Government decided to tighten the criteria for immigration in 2007 under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) : good language skills, sufficient knowledge of French history and the acceptance of the dominant norms and values are now required. These changes confirm the 'return of assimilation' observed in several Western European countries since the 1990s (Brubaker 2001) . A similar trend can be observed in the rules to obtain French citizenship. Candidates must prove that they support republican values and agree with dominant cultural standards, even in their private life. There is a trend that confuses nationality with national identity (Weil 2008) .
Conclusion
This historical view on integration, which focuses on the French model, shows that both the integration of migrants and a voluntary integration policy could not and cannot succeed in times of economic crises, where increasing social inequalities and declining social cohesion are common. Second, the colour-blind core of the republican model is challenged by immigrants' demands for socio-cultural recognition and also by established populist nationalism. The loss of the model's integration capacity is particularly significant in marginalised urban areas and among the youth of immigrant descent belonging to the classes populaires. In socio-cultural terms, these youth are no longer unified, as was the case with the working class in the 'red suburbs' A nationalistic backlash is also significant at the policy level, where immigrants acquiring French citizenship are selected based on cultural criteria, and where the idea of assimilability reappears. Both elements are an inversion of the models' egalitarian spirit.
Nevertheless, and in contrast to Wieviorka's position in this issue, the republican model cannot be considered to have completely failed. Within the longlasting discrepancy between colour-blind normativity and ethnic-cultural reality, French pragmatism has always regulated socio-cultural differences and now seems to adapt to new urban realities. The politique de la ville is one of the best examples of positive discrimination à la française. This territorialised social policy officially selects its areas based on socio-spatial criteria, but in reality, it targets an immigrant public in particular (Doytcheva 2007) . Thus, urban policies have become one of the most emblematic fields of French integration policy; they represent the survival of the republican model.
Indeed, in spite of the various programmes proposed by the politique de la ville, urban segregation has stabilised in French cities in the last decades (Fitoussi et al. 2004) . However, it does not only concern the classes populaires. Urban segregation is a residential, educational, socio-professional and ethnic hierarchy that goes from the transnational elites at the top, to the intermediary middle classes, then to the classes populaires with the workers, and finally to the immigrants right down at the bottom (Maurin 2004) . At this bottom, integration has become a euphemistic term that veils domination (Kokoreff and Lapeyronnie 2013, pp. 83-85) . The missing perspective of upward social mobility leads some immigrant youth to social behaviour that differs significantly from that of the middle classes.
By contrast, residents living in urban districts, where they encounter social and cultural diversity, can take opportunities to assimilate to dominant cultural codes and share values which offer them opportunities for upward social mobility. We have observed this phenomenon even among immigrants who have recently settled in France, such as Sub-Saharan African families, a population subject to racial discrimination. The youth that arrive in urban areas are characterised by mixed population hope for this mobility and do not reject the French part of their identity. By contrast, those living in deprived areas do not consider themselves as French although they possess French citizenship (Barou 2012) . To sum up, urban segregation is a spatial expression of increasing inequality and declining social cohesion; or inversely, and as Durkheim demonstrated, integration is only possible in a society that retains its solidarity, as our main hypothesis has posited.
